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Abstract
Deontic Logic was introduced in the ﬁrst half of the last century to formalize aspects of legal reasoning.
Since then a lot of eﬀort has gone into improving the formalism(s) and widening their applicability, including
in Computer Science and Software Engineering. One strand of work has focused on the use of an action
based approach to deontic operators, rather than the traditional property focused operators. We propose
a new version of this kind of deontic logic that has very nice meta-logical properties, avoids many of the
traditional problems of deontic logics and has an appealing treatment of contrary to duty reasoning. This
kind of reasoning provides a kind of conditional reasoning about having violated normative constraints and
describing the resulting consequences. We show how to apply this formalism to characterize fault tolerance
mechanisms and to then reason about the properties of the mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Deontic logic is a branch of modal logic which focuses on the study of the reasoning
arising in ethical and moral contexts, which usually involve norms and prescriptions
(see [3,12]). These logics, usually, consider two new modalities: permission and
obligation. Of course, related to them are the concepts of prohibition and violation.
These concepts arise naturally in fault-tolerance, where some actions are “ideal” or
“obligatory”, and the execution of any other action yields an error state. We have
proposed a deontic logic in [11], and in [9] we have studied the application of this
logic to fault-tolerance.
In fault-tolerant systems, it is usual to have situations where, after a violation,
we must perform some actions to recover from this violation. This is an instance of
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what is called by deontic logicians contrary-to-duty (or CTD for short) reasoning.
CTD reasoning has been an important object of study in deontic logic; this kind of
reasoning arises naturally in legal scenarios. However, in several deontic logics CTD
scenarios are inconsistent when formalized; this is sometimes thought of as being
paradoxical, since this is contrary to our intuition (in the sense that, intuitively,
these statements are not inconsistent).
In this paper we extend the logics introduced in [11] with the goal in mind
of obtaining a more expressive framework for allowing us to avoid the classical
problems that arise in contrary-to-duty scenarios. Furthermore, we present some
examples to illustrate that CTD statements are common in speciﬁcation of fault-
tolerant systems, and we show how we can deal with them using the proposed logic.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a brief introduction
to deontic logic and contrary-to-duty statements. In section 3 we describe our
version of deontic logic and we propose a more expressive extension. In sections
4 and 5 we show two examples: a simple train system and a formalization of the
Byzantine Generals problem [18]. These case studies allow us to demonstrate that
CTD reasoning arises naturally in fault-tolerance. We prove some properties of
the examples to illustrate the beneﬁts of using deontic logic to specify and verify
faul-tolerant systems.
2 Deontic Logics
Ernst Mally was the ﬁrst to try to capture the reasoning underlying norms and
prescriptions using a formal system, in particular Mally introduced obligation as a
predicate (together with other related operators) and provided an axiomatic system
for his logic. However, in Mally’s logic the concept of obligation is superﬂuous, in
the sense that, if we take O(ϕ) as saying it ought to be the case that ϕ is true, then
we obtain ϕ → O(ϕ), which trivializes the deontic operators. Since then, several
deontic logics have been proposed in the literature. Perhaps the most studied is the
so-called Standard Deontic Logic (or SDL) [12]. SDL is a particular case of normal
modal logics; this logic has the modality O(ϕ) (ϕ is obligatory); and the following
axioms are proposed to capture the notion of obligation [20]:
SDL0. all the tautologies of the language.
SDL1. O(ϕ → ψ)→ (O(ϕ)→ O(ψ)).
SDL2. O(ϕ)→ ¬O(¬ϕ).
For the rules we have:
• If  ϕ → ψ and  ϕ, then  ψ,
• If  ϕ, then  O(ϕ).
Equivalent axiomatizations of SDL can be found in [12] (this system is called OK+
in [3]). The second deduction rule means that we have a normal modal system.
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The semantics of SDL is given with Kripke structures [5], and the interpretation
of the obligation operator is the same as the ussual modal necessity (although this
axiomatization imposes a diﬀerent structure on the Kripke models; note that the
axioms imply that the Kripke structures are serial, i.e., every state has a successor).
The intuition of the semantics is as follows. If a state w is related with another
state v, this mean that the obligations occurring in w are true in v (in some way we
can think of v as an “ideal” world for w). Several consequences of this axiomatic
system have been criticized for being contrary to the intuitive properties of obliga-
tion. For example, a consequence of these axioms is the property O() (which can
be read as saying that there are always obligations; at least we have that all the tau-
tologies are obliged). Some people have argued that there could be scenarios where
nothing is obliged, and these kinds of scenarios are not possible in SDL. Another
problematic issue is the deﬁnition of permission which is introduced in the logic as
a dual of obligation, that is: P(ϕ) ↔ ¬O(¬ϕ). Note that this deﬁnition together
with axiom SDL2, imply that we have the following theorem: O(ϕ) → P(ϕ), i.e.,
obligation implies permission. If we see permission as modal possibility (which is
the case in SDL), then we have what is sometimes called Kant’s law: obligation
implies possibility (i.e., O(ϕ) → ϕ). It is not hard to ﬁnd examples where this
property is not desirable. It is not our intention to defend or argue against this
logical system; readers can take their own position. Further discussion about these
topics can be found in [12].
As explained in the introduction, we are interested in contrary-to-duty state-
ments. Let us introduce a standard example of CTD statements, the so-called
Gentle Killer paradox [14]. It can be stated as follows:
• It is forbidden to kill.
• If you kill, you have to kill gently.
• You kill.
In SDL the formalization of this paradox gives us an inconsistent set of sentences
[24]. The main problem is that, in SDL, incompatible obligations are inconsistent,
i.e.,  O(ϕ) ∧ O(¬ϕ) → ⊥. Contrary-to-duty scenarios are also usual in fault-
tolerance. We illustrate this fact with two examples in sections 4 and 5.
The Standard Deontic Logic is an ought-to-be deontic logic, i.e., the deontic
predicates are applied to predicates (e.g., it is obligatory that it is raining). Many
authors (e.g., [21,17]) have pointed out that several problems of deontic logics (para-
doxical statements and non-intuitive properties) can be solved by applying deontic
operators to actions instead of predicates. In [21], Meyer proposes to reduce de-
ontic predicates to modal operators (in a dynamic logic setting [15]). The main
idea behind this work is to use a constant predicate to indicate when a violation
has occurred. In dynamic deontic logic, we have propositional formulae together
with formulae of the type: [α]ϕ, where α is an action and ϕ is a formula. Actions
are built from a set of atomic actions and operators. Dynamic logics have the fol-
lowing operators: ; (sequential composition), unionsq (choice), ∗ (iteration). Intuitively,
the formula [α]ϕ means after executing the action α, the formula ϕ becomes true.
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In other words, using these formulae we can express speciﬁcations of actions in a
pre/post-condition style. Meyer reduces the notion of permission to modalities, as
follows: P(α) ≡ 〈α〉¬v, i.e., an action is allowed if and only if there is some way
of executing it such that we get a state without violations (where v represents the
idea that a violation has occured). A similar approach is presented by the FOREST
project [17,19], where a modal logic with actions (called MAL) is introduced, but
MAL considered several other action operators, for example:  (parallel execution)
and − (action complement). Many other variations of deontic logic with actions
have been presented in the literature. One diﬀerence between the logic presented
in section 3 and Meyer’s logic (and related approaches) is that in our logic there
is no relationship between deontic predicates and standard modalities, i.e., we do
not reduce deontic predicates to the concepts of possibility or necessity. We reject
the reduction of deontic predicates to modalities since we think that prescription
(what the system should do) and description (what the system does) must not be
mixed up. For example, following Meyer’s deﬁnition of permission, allowed actions
are also recovery actions (they recover the system from an error state). This is
undesirable in fault-tolerance: permitted actions may carry forward violations; this
is also noted by Sergot in [23].
3 A Deontic Action Logic with Stratiﬁed Norms
We have presented a deontic action logic in [11,8,7,10]; in this section we review
brieﬂy the basic deﬁnitions of this logic and we introduce an extension for this logic
to deal with contrary-to-duty reasoning.
We use vocabulary (or language) to refer to a tuple L = 〈Δ0,Φ0, V0, I0〉, where
Δ0 is a ﬁnite set of primitive actions: a1, ..., an, which represent the possible actions
of a part of the system and, perhaps, of its environment. Φ0 is an enumerable set
of propositional symbols denoted by p1, p2, . . .. V0 is a ﬁnite subset of V, where V =
{v1, v2, v3, . . .} is an inﬁnite, enumerable set of “violation” propositions. The indices
in I0 correspond to a stratiﬁcation of the concept of norm, where the stratiﬁcation
corresponds to degrees of fault in the system being modeled. All these sets are
mutually disjoint. The atomic actions in a vocabulary can be combined as follows
to form more complex action terms (denoted by Δ): Δ0 ⊆ Δ and ∅,U ∈ Δ. If
α, β ∈ Δ, then αunionsqβ ∈ Δ, αβ ∈ Δ and α ∈ Δ. No other expression belongs to Δ.
On the other hand, the formulae of this logic (denoted by Φ) are deﬁned as follows.
If ϕ ∈ Φ0 ∪ V0, then ϕ ∈ Φ. If ϕ and ψ are formulae, then ψ → ψ,¬ψ ∈ Φ. If ϕ is a
formula and α an action, then [α]ϕ is a formula. If α is an action and i ∈ I0, then
Piw(α) and P
i(α) are formulae. If ϕ and ψ are formulae, then ENϕ, A(ϕ U ψ) and
E(ϕ U ψ) ∈ Φ. If α and β are actions and S ⊆ Δ0, then DoneS(α) and α =act β are
formulae. B is a formula.
The intuitive reading of the modal and deontic formulae is as follows:
• [α]ϕ, after executing α in any possible way, ϕ will hold.
• [α1 unionsq α2]ϕ, every way of executing α1 or α2 leads to ϕ.
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• [α]ϕ, after executing an action diﬀerent from α, ϕ holds.
• [α1  α2]ϕ, every way of executing both α1 and α2 leads to ϕ.
• Pi(α), all the diﬀerent ways of executing α are allowed, for the stratiﬁed level i.
• Piw(α), there is at least one way of executing α which is allowed, for the stratiﬁed
level i.
• [U]ϕ, any execution of the component yields ϕ.
• ENϕ, in some path, in the next instant ϕ is true.
• A(ϕ U ψ), in every path the formulae ϕ is true until ψ becomes true.
• E(ϕ U ψ), in every path the formulae ϕ is true until ψ becomes true.
• Done(α), α was the last action executed.
B is true at the beginning of time and so denotes the initial state of execution of
any system. The temporal operators have the standard meaning in a branching
temporal logic. Note that, if we consider some complete axiomatization of boolean
algebras ΦBA, then we obtain Δ/ΦBA the boolean (atomic) algebra of action terms.
It is important to note that the atoms in this boolean algebra are each interpreted
as singletons or the empty set.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [models] Given a language L = 〈Φ0,Δ0, V0, I0〉, a L-Structure is a
tuple: M = 〈W,R, E , I, {Pi | i ∈ I0}〉 where:
• W, is a set of worlds.
• E , is a non-empty set of (names of) events.
• R, is an E-labelled relation between worlds. We require that, if (w,w′, e) ∈ R
and (w,w′′, e) ∈ R, then w′ = w′′, i.e., R is functional.
• I, is a function:
· For every p ∈ Φ0 : I(p) ⊆ W
· For every α ∈ Δ0 : I(α) ⊆ E , and I(α) is ﬁnite.
In addition, the interpretation I has to satisfy the following properties:
I.1 For every αi ∈ Δ0: |I(αi)−
⋃{I(αj) | αj ∈ (Δ0 − {αi})}| ≤ 1.
I.2 For every e ∈ I(a1 unionsq . . . unionsq an): if e ∈ I(αi) ∩ I(αj), where αi = αj ∈ Δ0,
then: ∩{I(αk) | αk ∈ Δ0 ∧ e ∈ I(αk)} = {e}.
I.3 E = ⋃αi∈Δ0 I(αi).
• each P i ⊆ W × E is a relation which indicates which event is permitted in which
world with respect to permissions with index i.
Roughly speaking, the structure gives us a labelled transition system, whose
labels are events, which are produced by some local action or they could also cor-
respond to external events. Note that we have a set of events, but actions are only
interpreted over ﬁnite subsets, whose intersections satisfy the Hausdorﬀ condition
(implied by conditions I.1 and I.2), i.e., we require that every one-point set can
be generated from the actions of the component; this ensures that the labels in the
transitions are uniquely determined by some parallel execution of actions in the
component and perhaps some environmental actions.
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We use maximal traces to give the semantics of the temporal operators. Below,
we use the following notation. Given an inﬁnite trace (or path) π = s0
e0→ s1 e1→
s2
e2→ ..., we denote by πi = si ei→ si+1 ei+1→ ... the subpath of π starting at position
i. The notation πi = si is used to denote the i-th element in the path, and we write
π[i, j] (where i ≤ j) for the subpath si ei→ ... ej→ sj+1. Meanwhile π(i) denotes the
event ei. Finally, given a ﬁnite path π′ = s′0
e′0→ .... e
′
n→ sn+1, we say π′  π if π′ is an
initial subpath of π, that is: si = s′i and ei = e
′
i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and we denote by ≺
the strict version of .
The formal deﬁnition of the relationship π, i,M  ϕ (ϕ is true at instant i in the
structure M) can be found in [6]. In [6] we present a sound and complete axiomatic
system for this logic.
Having several versions of permissions is useful in practice, in particular when we
have contrary-to-duty statements. Consider, for example, the Gentle Killer paradox
(introduced in section 2):
• It is forbidden to kill.
• If you kill, you ought to kill gently.
• You kill.
As explained before, in SDL the formalization of this paradox gives us an inconsis-
tent set of sentences [24]. We can formalize this scenario as follows:
• F1(k)
• kg  k
• nk  k =act ∅
• O2(nk unionsq kg)
• ANDone(k)
We consider the actions k (kill), kg (kill gently) and nk (not kill). The ﬁrst axiom
says that it is forbidden to kill. The second formula says that the action of killing
gently (kg) is a way of killing. The third axiom expresses that killing and not
killing are disjoint actions. The fourth formula says that, if we will kill, then we
have to kill gently. In the last formula, we use the Done() operator to state that
we will kill (which is expressed saying that the next action is to kill). In this
case, we consider in the vocabulary two indexes: 1 and 2 pointing to the fact
that there are two diﬀerent levels of norms in the speciﬁcation. In contrast to
standard deontic logic, these sentences are not contradictory in our setting. For
example, the structure illustrated in ﬁgure 1 is a model of this set of sentences.
The structure in this ﬁgure has three states w,w1, w2, and we have I(k) = {e1, e2},
I(kg) = {e1} and I(nk) = {e3}. The labels on the transitions indicate which actions
are executed and which are not in each transition. The upper dashed arrow denotes
a transition that is forbidden with respect to index 1 but not for index 2. The lower
dashed arrow indicates an arrow which is forbidden for both indexes. In [22], Meyer
sketched an extension of dynamic deontic logic where he considers several versions of
permission and obligation; he uses this extension to model some paradoxes; however,
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
w2
Fig. 1. Model for the Gentle Killer
in this version deontic predicates are reduced to modalities, and therefore, several
violation predicates are introduced in the logic to model permission. As we explain
above, deﬁning permission by means of modalities is not always a good choice when
modelling fault-tolerant systems: the notions of prescription and description are
mixed up and, as we remarked above, this is not desirable in fault-tolerance, where
the notion of allowed or permitted action must be diﬀerent to that of recovery
action.
4 First Example: A Simple Train System
We consider a simple example of a train system. Train systems are those systems
that control the movement of trains through a network of rail segments. Fault-
tolerance is a key aspect of these systems: a fault in the system may cause a train
collision and the loss of human life. These kinds of systems are the object of active
research in the fault-tolerance community, see [2,16,1].
Our system is made up of a collection of trains: t1, . . . , tn and a set of rail
segments r1, . . . , rm (we assume n < m). Rail segments are connected to other rail
segments; in each of these connections, the rails have one signal controlling access to
them. The goal of the signal is to prevent trains from entering into a segment when
another train is already in it. The signals can be green (when the segment is free)
or red (when another train is in the segment). We have the following predicates.
For each 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we have a predicate ti.rj which is true when
the train ti is in segment rj; we also have a predicate ti.s (true when the train is
stopped). For each 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we have a proposition rj.green which is true when
the signal of the rail rj is green. We have a violation predicate vj for every 0 ≤ j ≤ m
which is true when we have two trains in the segment rj. (This is implemented by
a sensor in the segment which detects the two trains.) Finally, we have propositions
riRrj which indicate that ri and rj are connected.
We have the following actions: ti.move(j) (the train ti moves to the segment
rj), ti.stop (this action stops the train), ri.ggreen (the signal of rail ri is set to
green) and ri.gred (the signal of segment ri is set to red).
Recall that in section 3 we introduced a logic with vocabularies that can have
several versions of deontic predicates. In this example, we consider three versions
of deontic predicates for each train, and one version for each segment. We denote
by ti.Pk(), ti.Pkw() and ti.O
k() the permissions and obligations corresponding to
train ti. We use the same notation for the segments. Furthermore, we use some
syntactic sugar and instead of writing ti.Ok(ti.move(j)) we write ti.Ok(move(j)),
P.F. Castro, T.S.E. Maibaum / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 17–34 23
i.e., we do not repeat twice the trains and the segments when the second occurrence
can be deduced from the context.
The axioms are as follows:
T1.
⊕
1≤j≤m
ti.rj
(for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.) (⊕1≤j≤m ti.rj denotes the exclusive “or” of the predicates
ti.rj.) This axiom states that each train is in one and only one segment.
T2. ¬Done(U)→
∧
(1≤i≤n)
∧
(1≤j≤n)∧(i=j)
¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk)
This axiom says that, at the beginning of time, there are not two trains in the same
segment.
T3.
∨
1≤i≤m
(riRrj ∧ tk.ri)→ 〈tk.moveto(j)〉
(for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ n.) Axioms T3 say that train tk can move to
segment rj if and only if the train k is in a segment that is connected to rj.
T4. ¬riRri
(for every i.) Segments are not connected with themselves.
T5. (
∨
1≤i,j≤n∧i=j
ti.rk ∧ tj.rk)↔ vk
(where 1 ≤ k ≤ m.) There is a violation in segment rk if and only if there are two
trains in segment rk.
T6. ti.rj → rj.O1(gred)
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(for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.) When there is a train in a segment, the signal
for this segment must be red.
T7. (
∧
1≤i≤n
¬ti.rj)→ rj.O1(ggreen)
(for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m.) If there is no train in the segment, then the signal for the
segment must be green.
T8. ¬ti.rk ∧ ¬rk.green→ ti.F1(move(k))
(for every 1 ≤ i ≤ i, 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2.) If the signal of a segment is red,
then any train is forbidden to move into the segment.
T9. ti.move(k)  tj.move(k) =act ∅
(for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i = j.) We suppose that two trains cannot enter to the
same segment simultaneously.
T10. tj.F1(move(k))→ tj.O2(move(k) unionsq stop)
(for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.) This axiom formalizes a contrary-
to-duty statement: if you are forbidden to move to segment rk, then you are obliged
to not move the train to segment rk, or to stop the train. This statement also can
be read as saying: if you are forbidden to move to segment rk, and you do it, you
have to stop the train. This is similar to the Gentle Killer paradox.
Note that we are only taking into account the trains that for some reason ignore
a red signal and enter into the segment. We must also specify what happens when
another train is already in the segment, to avoid train collisions.
T11. ti.rj ∧ rj.v→ ti.O2(stop)
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Another bad scenario is when a train is “locked” in a segment, i.e., when a train is
in a segment where all the connected segments have their signal set to red. In this
case the train is obliged to stop.
T12. ti.rk ∧ (
∧
1≤j≤m
(〈ti.move(j)〉 → F1(ti.move(j))))→ ti.O3(stop)
The following axiom says that trains cannot move to a segment and at the same
time this segment’s signal changes to red; we assume some kind of mechanism which
prevents a signal from changing at the same moment that a train is entering the
segment.
T13. ti.move(j)  rj.gred =act ∅
(for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.) We deﬁne the behaviour of each action with
the following axioms.
T14. ([ti.take(j)]ti.rj) ∧ (¬ti.rj → [i.take(j)]¬ti.stop)
T15. ([rj.ggreen]rj.g) ∧ (¬rj.g→ [rj.ggreen]¬rj.g)
T16. ([rj.gred]¬rj.g) ∧ (¬rj.g→ [rj.gred]¬rj.g)
We can prove some properties of this speciﬁcation. For example, we can prove that,
if obligations of type 2 are fulﬁlled by trains, then there is no danger of having two
trains in the same segment. Let Φ be the following set of formulae:
Φ1 = {AG(ti.O2(stop)→ ANDone(ti.stop)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
These (ﬁnite) sets of formulae express that trains fulﬁl the obligations of type 2.
We can consider a similar set of formulae for the segments:
Φ2 = {AG(ri.O1(gred)→ ANDone(ri.gred)) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Using these sets of formulae, we can prove the following property:
Φ1,Φ2 Train ¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk)
Informally, when trains fulﬁl their obligations of stopping at a red signal and seg-
ments fulﬁl the obligation of setting their signal to red when there are trains in the
segment, then we cannot have two trains in the same segment.
The proof uses the axiom of induction. Using axiom T2 and propositional logic
we obtain Train ¬Done(U)→ ¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk). Now, we prove:
Φ1,Φ2 Train ¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk)→ [U]¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk).
P.F. Castro, T.S.E. Maibaum / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 17–3426
The proof is a follows:
1. ¬ti.rk ∧ tj.rk → rk.O2(gred) T6
2. rk.O1(gred) → [U]Done(rk.gred) PDL, TempAx1, Assumption
3. rk.gred 	 ti.move(k) =act ∅ T13
4. ¬ti.rk ∧ tj.rk → [ti.move(k)]⊥ PDL, 1,2,3
5. ¬ti.rk → [ti.move(k)]¬ti.rk PDL, T14
6. ¬ti.rk ∧ tj.rk → [U]¬ti.rk PDL, 4, 5
7. ti.rk ∧ ¬tj.rk → rk.O1(gred) T6
8. rk.gred 	 tj.move(k) =act ∅ T13
9. ¬tj.rk ∧ ti.rk → [tj.move(k)]⊥ PDL, 1,2,3
10. ¬tj.rk → [tj.move(k)]¬ti.rk PDL, T14
11. ¬tj.rk ∧ ti.rk → [U]¬tj.rk PDL, 4, 5
12. ¬tj.rk ∧ ¬ti.rk → [ti.move(k) 	 tj.move(k)]⊥ PDL, T9
13. ¬tj.rk ∧ ¬ti.rk→
[ti.rk.move(k) 	 tj.rk.move(k)]¬tj.rk ∧ ¬ti.rk PDL, T14
14. ¬tj.rk ∧ ¬ti.rk→ [U]¬tj.rk ∧ ¬ti.rk PDL, 6, 11, 12, 13
15. ¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk → [U]¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk)) PDL, 14, 11, 6
During the proof we use the acronym PDL to point out that basic property of the
logic is used (see [6] for a listing of the basic properties). Therefore, using the
induction rule, we get train ¬(ti.rk ∧ tj.rk). Another property is that, when the
obligations of type 3 are fulﬁlled, then when we have two trains in a segment, both
will stop. The property can be stated as follows:
ti.O
3(stop)→ ANDone(ti.stop) Train ti.rk ∧ tj.rk → ANti.stop ∧ tj.stop.
The proof is straightforward from the axioms.
We can think of this property as a recovery property, since from a state where
there is a (dangerous) violation we go into a state where we still have a violation
but it is safe, since it is free of train collisions. As stated in [4], fault-tolerance is
not only about reaching a state free of error after a violation. But also, in some
cases, it is acceptable to reach a safe state, where no further violations might arise.
Of course, this example can be made more realistic, and we can state that after
two trains are stopped in the same segment, then one of them can be removed,
or an alternative exit can be made available. We keep the example as simple as
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s0
t1.r1, t2.r2, r1Rr2
t1.move(2)
 
  
 	 
     
s1
t1.r2, t2.r2, r2.v, r1Rr2, r2.green
t1.stop

	
Fig. 2. Example of of violation
possible to show how deontic predicates can be used to express requirements over
speciﬁcations, which, when not fulﬁlled, yield a violation or bad behaviour.
On the other hand, if obligations of type 2 are not fulﬁlled, we can reach danger-
ous states. In ﬁgure 2, we have a model with two states s0 and s1; below each state,
we have the predicates that are true at this state. We have two segments which
are connected, and we have two trains, t1 is in segment r1 and t2 is in segment
r2. Since segment r2 is occupied, t1 is forbidden to move to that segment, but if it
moves, then it must stop. The train moves to that segment and it does not stop.
We reach a state where the two trains are in the same segment, and t1 executes
any action but t1.stop, which will produce a collision in the real world. This model
also shows that the contrary to duty predicate expressed by axiom T10 does not
introduce any inconsistency in the speciﬁcation.
5 Second Example: Byzantine Generals
The Byzantine generals problem was stated originally in [18]; the problem is the
following. We have a general with n−1 lieutenants. The general and his lieutenants
can communicate with each other using messengers. The general may decide to
attack an enemy city or to retreat; then, he sends the order to his lieutenants.
Some of the lieutenants might be traitors. Traitors might deliver false messages
or perhaps they avoid sending a message that they received. The loyal lieutenants
must agree on attacking or retreating. This problem is a classic problem of fault-
tolerance and distributed computing. Diﬀerent solutions have been proposed, for
example in [18,13,25]. These solutions are simpler when an authenticated way of
communication is used, i.e, traitors cannot lie. A solution proposed in the original
paper is using signed messages in such a way that signatures cannot be forged (using
some encryption protocol). The analogy with fault-tolerance is straightforward: the
general is a sender process, the lieutenants are processes that have to agree with
some decision taken by the sender. The traitors are faulty processes.
The speciﬁcation that we provide below uses the ideas introduced in [13,25],
where authenticated messages are used. The speciﬁcation does not assume any form
of authentication to prevent forged messages. Instead, deontic predicates are used
to express that traitors are forbidden to lie. Of course, they might forge messages
anyway. We consider this as a malicious behaviour which is a worse betrayal than
to not obey orders. The important point here is that deontic operators allow us to
abstract from the mechanisms that are used to prevent traitors from lying.
We have the following actions: li.sendA(j) (lieutenant li sends the message of
attack to lieutenant lj), li.fwd(k, A, j) (lieutenant li forwards to lj the message of
attack that he received from lk), li.betray (lieutenant li becomes a traitor). We
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consider a clock that allows lieutenants to synchronize; the action tt increments the
clock by one unit of time. The speciﬁcation uses m+ 1 rounds of messages, which
are coordinated by means of the clock. We have the following predicates: li.Aj
(this predicate indicates that li has received a message from lj saying that he
must attack). We have a violation predicate li.v for each lieutenant (this predicate
is true when li is a traitor, i.e., a li is in a violation state) and li.d (this predicate
is true when li has decided to attack), ri (this predicate is true when we are in
round i od the decision protocol).
We assume that l0 is the general, the messages are delivered correctly and all the
lieutenants can communicate directly with each other, in such a way that they can
recognize who is sending a message. We have n lieutenants and the speciﬁcation
that is shown below uses a constant m < n that indicates that the speciﬁcation
tolerates at most m traitors.
(For the deontic predicates we use the same notation conventions as in the train
example.) The axioms are the following. Note that the following are axiom schemas,
each formula denotes a ﬁnite collection of axioms.
1. ¬Done(U)→ (
∧
(1≤i≤n)
∧
(1≤j≤n)∧(i=j)
¬li.Aj) ∧ r1 ∧ (
∧
1≤i≤n
¬li.d)
At the beginning, the lieutenants have not received any message, we are in the ﬁrst
round and the lieutenants (with the exception of the general) have not taken any
decision (by default the decision is to retreat).
2. ¬Done(U) ∧ ¬l0.v→ (l0.d→ AGl0.d) ∧ (¬l0.d→ AG¬l0.d)
If the general is loyal, then he keeps holding the same decision that he has taken at
the beginning.
3.
∧
1≤i≤n
li.O
1(betray)
Lieutenants should not betray.
4. ¬Done(U) ∧ l0.d→ l0.O2(
⊔
1≤i≤n
sendA(i))
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At the beginning, if the general decided to attack, then he ought to send a message
with his decision to the other lieutenants.
5. (rj → [tt]rj+1) ∧ ¬rm → 〈tt〉
These axioms specify the behaviour of the clock.
6. ANtt
We always increment the clock.
7. rk ∧ li.Aj1 ∧ . . . ∧ li.Ajk → li.d
(where 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j1, . . . , jk ≤ 1 are k diﬀerent numbers.)
These axioms indicate that, if in round k the lieutenant li has received k messages
with the order to attack, then he decides to attack.
8. rk ∧ li.Aj1 ∧ . . . ∧ li.Ajk →
li.O
2((
⊔
1≤j≤n∧j=j1...∧j=jk
sendA(j)  fwd(j1, A, j)  . . .  fwd(jk, A, j)))
These axioms indicate that, if in round rk the lieutenant li has received k messages
with the order to attack from k diﬀerent persons, then he ought to notify all the rest
of the lieutenants about the decision to attack; he also forwards all the messages
received.
9. li.v ∧ ¬li.Aj → F3(
⊔
1≤k≤n
fwd(j, A, k))
If a lieutenant is a traitor, then he is forbidden to lie. This involves contrary-to-duty
reasoning. Lieutenants might betray at any moment (which is forbidden), but, if
they betray, then they must not lie.
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10. rk ∧ ¬li.v ∧ ¬li.Aj1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬li.Ajt →
[
⊔
1≤k≤n
sendA(k)]⊥ ∧ [
⊔
1≤k,k′≤n
fwd(k, A, k′)]⊥
(where 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and t > n − k.) These axioms say that, when in
round rk a loyal lieutenant has not received at least k messages saying that he must
attack, then he does not send nor forward any message.
11. rm+1 → (li.d→ AGli.d) ∧ (¬li.d→ AG¬li.d)
(for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n.) These axioms expresses that the decision taken in round m+ 1
is ﬁnal.
12. [li.sendA(j)]lj.Ai
13. [li.fwd(k, A, j)]lk.Aj
14. ¬li.Aj → [lj.sendA(i) unionsq
⊔
1≤t≤n
lt.fwd(i, A, j)]¬li.Aj
15. ¬li.v ∧ li.d→ [U]li.d
16. li.Aj → [U]li.Aj
(for every 1 ≤ k, i, j ≤ n.) These axioms specify the behaviour of the actions
li.sendA(j) and lt.fwd(i, A, j). Axiom 15 says that, if a loyal lieutenant has decided
to attack he sticks with his decision; axiom 16 says that lieutenants do not forget
the messages received. Finally, we describe the behaviour of the action betray.
17. [li.betray]li.v
18. ¬li.v→ [li.betray]¬li.v
The axioms of the speciﬁcation depend on a number m which, intuitively, is the
number of traitors for which the speciﬁcation ensures that the loyal lieutenants will
agree on a decision. We sketch the proof of that fact that, if we have less than m
traitors, then the loyal lieutenants reach an agreement. Consider, ﬁrst, the following
P.F. Castro, T.S.E. Maibaum / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 17–34 31
set of formulae:
Φ1 = {li.F3(fwd(k, A, j))→ ANDone(li.fwd(k, A, j)) | for any 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n}
This set of formulae say that traitors do not lie. The following formulae say that
there are at most m traitors:
Φ2 = AG(¬lj1 .v ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ljn−m .v)
(for some diﬀerent 0 ≤ j1, . . . , jn−m ≤ n.) Another useful supposition is that loyal
lieutenants fulﬁl their obligations, which is expressed by the following formulae:
Φ3 = {li.O2(α)→ ANDone(α) | for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Then, if we suppose that there are at least n− m lieutenants who are not traitors,
traitors do not lie and that loyal lieutenants fulﬁl their obligations, we can prove
that in round m+ 1 the loyal lieutenants reach an agreement. This is expressed with
the following formulae:
Φ1,Φ2,Φ3 Bizm rm+1 → (lj1 .d↔ . . . ↔ ljn−m .d).
(We denote by Bizm the speciﬁcation given above.) This property follows trivially
if we prove that any two loyal lieutenants reach an agreement. This is expressed by
the following property:
Property 1
Φ1,Φ2,Φ3 Bizm rm+1 → (lu1 .d↔ lju2 .d).
(for any u1, u2 ∈ {j1, . . . , jn−m}.)
Sketch of Proof. At the beginning we have ¬lu1 .d and ¬lu2 .d. If, in any round rk
with k ≤ m, we have lu1 .d by axiom 9, and since we assume that loyal lieutenants
fulﬁl their obligations, we know that the action lu1 .sendA(lu2) will be executed and
also lu1 will forward all of the k messages that he received with an attack order.
This implies that, in round rk+1, lieutenant lu2 will have received k+ 1 messages
saying attack, and, therefore, by axiom 8, in round rk+1 we have lu2 .d. The same
reasoning can be applied to lu2 .d in round rk with k ≤ m. If lk1 .d is true in round
rm+1 and false in all the earlier rounds, then this lieutenant has received m+ 1
messages saying “attack”, but since traitors do not lie by assumption and also we
assumed that we have at most m traitors, lieutenant lu1 have received an order
to attack from some loyal lieutenant, which by axiom 9 sent the same orders to
lieutenant lu2 ; this implies that in the next round after receiving the order from the
loyal lieutenant, both have decided to attack by axiom 7. 
It is interesting to note that when traitors lie, the property shown above is not
true. Suppose that we have three lieutenants: l0, l1, l2 and l1 is a traitor. Consider
the speciﬁcation instanced with m = 1 (only one traitor). The model in ﬁgure
3 shows a counterexample; we have three states: s0, s1, s2, the initial state is s0.
Below each state the predicates that are true at that state are shown, the predicates
which are false are not shown. At the beginning, we have that no lieutenant is a
traitor, and that the general l0 has decided to retreat. Each transition is labelled
with the actions that are executed in that transition. In the ﬁrst transition, l1
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s0
r0
l1.betraytt

 
	  

s1
r1, l1.t
l1.fwd(0,A,2)tt

 
	  

s2
r2, l2.d
Fig. 3. Counterexample when traitors lie
becomes a traitor; the dashed arrow indicates that a forbidden action was executed.
After that, l1 lies to l2 and he forwards a message that he did not receive; this is
also a forbidden action. As a consequence, in round r2, lieutenants l2 and l0 do
not agree since one has decided to attack and the other to retreat.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we have introduced an extension of the deontic action logic presented
in [11,10,8,7]. The obtained logic allow us to capture contrary-to-duty statements,
which have shown to be hard to deal with by other deontic formalisms. CTD
structures are common in fault-tolerance. We have grounded this claim with two
examples: ﬁrst, we described the formalization of a simple train system, and we
shown how contrary-to-duty statements arise in this scenario; we prove some prop-
erties of the example and we show a scenario where the deontic constraints in the
speciﬁcation are violated, and, as a consequence, a non-desirable system state is
reached. As a second example, we have described a speciﬁcation of the Byzantine
Generals problem [18], a classic case study in fault-tolerance. Using this example,
we show that deontic predicates allow us to have several layers of reasoning about
a speciﬁcation; this is mainly obtained using stratiﬁed norms, where violations of
the norms at some level are tolerated, while the violation of norms at other levels
are not.
The logic presented in this paper can be extended in several ways to obtain
more expressive frameworks. A ﬁrst extension is to enrich the logic with ﬁrst-order
operators; this will allow us to express interesting properties related to data, and
to deal with more complex examples. A second extension is to introduce the notion
of module or component. This allows one to simplify designs and to enable com-
positional reasoning over deontic speciﬁcations. We have done this partially in [6],
where we have shown, using Dijkstra’s example of dining philosophers, how speciﬁ-
cations can be modularized and how the reasoning about speciﬁcations is simpliﬁed
by using components. Interestingly, the structuring of speciﬁcations enables a mod-
ular reasoning about the violations arising during a system execution; undoubtedly
this deserves further investigation.
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